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Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
Joseph Raz*
Most people tend unreflectively to assume that laws belong to legal
systems. "Most educated people," writes H. L. A. Hart, "have the
idea that the laws in England form some sort of system, and that in
France or the United States or Soviet Russia and, indeed, in almost
every part of the world which is thought of as a separate 'country'
there are legal systems which are broadly similar in structure in spite
of important differences." ' This includes for most people the assumption that laws differ from non-legal rules and principles. There are,
for example, moral rules and principles, social customs, constitutions
and regulations of voluntary associations, and so on, which are not
laws. Many legal philosophers have tried to justify this common assumption. Various criteria have been offered for demarcating the
limits of law, for testing whether or not a particular standard belongs
to a particular legal system. Various suggestions have been made concerning the importance of the distinction between what is legal and
what is not, and the ways in which, by preserving it, we promote our
understanding of law and society. For it has often been acknowledged
that the distinction is not an easy one to draw in precise terms, and
that any reasonable test would admit the presence of borderline cases.
Despite these difficulties many theorists have thought that the distinction is worth preserving, partly because it is not difficult to apply in
the majority of cases and partly because it seemed to them crucial for
a proper understanding of law and society.
On this, as on almost any other fundamental question, opinions
differ. There have been theorists who disputed the possibility of drawing the distinction between laws and non-legal norms, or who thought
that far from clarifying it actually obscures our understanding of law
and society. Recently, in a powerful article, Professor Dworkin has
joined those who challenge the orthodox position that what is law may
be separated from what is not. But the way in which Professor Dworkin
formulates his conclusion is revealing. "I conclude," he writes, "that
...we must reject the positivists' first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in
the form of a master rule."2 He clearly believes that there is no test,
* Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford. M. Jur. 1954. Hebrew University,
Jerusalem; D. Phil. 1967, Oxford.
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2-3 (1951).
2. Dworkin, The fodel of Rules, 35 U. Ciu. L. REv. 14, 45 (1967), reprintcd under
the title Is Law A System of Rules?, in Ess.,,s IN LEAL l HILOSOi'Y 25. 59 (R. Summers

ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin, with page references to the original article and,
in brackets, to the reprinted paper].
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however complex, which distinguishes "the law of a community" from
"other social standards," but he explicitly rejects only Hart's way of
drawing the distinction by reference to "a master rule," the rule of
recognition. As Professor Dworkin makes clear, he chooses to concentrate his attack on Hart, not just because he is concerned with the
defects of Hart's theory, but because it is the most sophisticated version of the view he is challenging. In evaluating Professor Dworkin's
case it is essential to try to separate those comments which bear merely
on Hart's views from those which go to the root of the matter and cast
doubt on the advisability of drawing a distinction between laws and
other standards or on the very possibility of doing so.
I am not concerned here with refuting Professor Dworkin's criticism
of Hart or of "positivism," as defined by him, in general.3 My main
concern is to argue that there is nothing in Professor Dworkin's arguments to show that there is reason to abandon the attempt to draw the
limits of law. I will also suggest some, though by no means all, of the
reasons which should lead us to persevere in the attempt. Professor
Dworkin's arguments turn on the crucial role that principles play in
the law, and it is to the examination of legal principles that we must
4
first turn.

3.

If pressed to find allies I will certainly find them among those commonly known

as legal positivists. I doubt, however, whether on examination we will find any legal
philosopher who fulfills Professor Dworkin's definition of a positivist. His positivist is
as rare an animal as the mechanical jurisprudent. But that is a different story.
4. Throughout this essay the expressions "norm," "standard," "rule," and "prin.
ciple" are extensively used. The sense in which these terms are employed will emerge In
the discussion. The following diagram summarizes their relations to one another. Occa.
sional deviant usages (see, e.g., pp. 827-28, 835 infra) will be distinguished.
Standards

Legal standards

Legal norms

Particular

Laws which are not norms
(e.g., definition of the
territorial sphere of
validity of a legal system)
General legal

legal norms

norms

Legal rules
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Non-legal standards
(including non-legal
rules and principles)

Legal principles

Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
I. Legal Rules and Legal Principles
A.

The Individuationof Laws

Classifying laws into logically distinct categories has always been
one of the major tasks of legal philosophy. Many generations of theorists have shared in repeated attempts to analyze the logical characteristics of laws and to identify and contrast various types of laws in
respect of their logical properties. Professor Dworkin's analysis of the
nature of legal principles is yet another contribution to this venture.
Professor Dworkin calls our attention to a logical distinction between
various laws which has been neglected by some, and which he attempts
to analyze: the distinction between rules and principles.
The classification of laws presupposes a solution to the more fundamental problem of the individuation of laws, i.e., an answer to the
question "What is to count as one complete law?" A brief explanation
must be given of both the nature of this problem, and of the reasons
an answer to it is presupposed by any classification of laws.0
We find our law in statute books and law reports. These are neatly
divided into separate judgments, statutes, regulations, by-laws, and so
on. It might seem that to find what is one complete law is an easy
task. Every section in a statute, every judgment of a court embodies
one complete law. But to say this is to misunderstand the question. As
Bentham reminded us in 1789:
What is a law? What the part of a law? The subject of these
questions, it is to be observed, is the logical, the ideal, the intellectual whole, not the physical one: the law, and not the statute.
An enquiry, directed to the latter sort of object, could neither
admit of difficulty nor afford instruction. In this sense . . . [s]o
much as was embraced by one and the same act of authentication,
so much as received the touch of the sceptre at one stroke, is one
law: a whole law, and nothing more. A statute of George II made
to substitute an or instead of an and in a former statute is a complete law; a statute containing an entire body of laws, perfect in
all its parts, would not be more so. By the word law then, as often
as it occurs in the succeeding pages is meant that ideal object, of
which the part, the whole, or the multiple, or an assemblage of
parts, wholes, or multiples mixed together, is exhibited by a
statute; not the statute which exhibits them.0
5. For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see J. RAz, TilE Co.cEr OF A
chs. 4, 6 (1970).
6. INTRODUCION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISL.M1ON, in J. BL%IIAt, A

LEGAL SYSTEMi

FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT with AN INTRODuCTION
LEGISLATION 429-30 n.1 (V. Harrison ed. 1960).

TO TlnE PRINCII'LES OF MORALS AND
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In a sense Bentham's point is known to every student of law who,
when in need to learn the law bearing on a problem, will turn first
not to the law reports or statute books but to the legal textbook,
whose purpose is to represent the content of the law in an orderly
fashion while largely disregarding the fact that any given paragraph
may be derived from various statutes and precedents. Authors of text.
books and students of law generally, however, while being largely
indifferent7 to the original divisions of the law by the lawmaker,8 are
equally indifferent to any other attempt to divide the legal material
into separate and complete laws. Their interest is in the content of the
law; its formal structure does not concern them. Not so the legal philosopher. He is sometimes more interested in the formal structure of laws
than in their particular content. To study their formal structure, their
logical properties, he must have a doctrine of individuation of laws.
Let me illustrate the point with a few examples. Let us assume that
a legal philosopher tells us that all laws are commands. We produce
three counter-examples. The first is a section in a constitution saying
that "Parliament shall have power to enact laws concerning the rights
and duties of property." The second is a section in a statute providing
that "every person of age and sound mind shall have power to make
a will determining the disposition of his property after death." The
third is a statement made by a court in rendering judgment stating
that "every person has a right to personal security." None of these, we
claim, is a command; therefore, not every law is a command. Have
we refuted the theory of our philosopher friend? We have done so
only if the three statements we produced are each a statement of one
complete law. For our friend may claim, as did Austin and Bentham,
for example, that they are merely descriptions of parts of laws or deductions from proper descriptions of laws. He may claim that our
constitutional provision does, indeed, establish a law which is a command. It is a command to all to obey any laws made by Parliament
regulating the rights and duties of property. This was not the language
used by the legislator, but this is the proper description of the con.
stitutional law he made. Statements that Parliament has power to
enact such laws made subsequent to the adoption of the constitution
7. Except occasionally for purposes of interpretation.
8. When there is a lawmaker. Much of the law is developed by way of ctstom and the
constantly evolving practices of the courts. Some of the most important laws, ag Professor

Dworkin reminds us, were not formulated by legal institutions. They underlie instittt,
tional activities and are first formulated by commentators.

Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
are true statements of law, but they do not properly describe a law.
They are valid deductions from a statement which does properly
describe the law and which shows that it is really a command of a
special type: a command to obey.
As to our second example, our philosopher friend may claim that,
by enacting the section relating to wills which ve have quoted, the
legislator made not one complete law but a part of many distinct laws,
all of which are commands. The laws relating to property, he would
claim, are in fact enormously complicated commands prohibiting certain people from interfering with property in certain ways. These
commands apply only to people not owning the property or not having
certain other rights in it. The commands, therefore, include elaborate
specifications of their conditions of application, and the statutory
provision we cited is part of these conditions of application. It states
in effect that a person should be exempt from the prohibition against
interference if, e.g., a deceased owner of the property named him in
his will as the future owner, and that other people will be exempt
from the prohibition if he subsequently transfers the property or an
appropriate right in it to them, etc. Thus, our friend will patiently
continue, our mistake was to think that the statutory provision is a
complete law, whereas in fact it is merely a part of many laws. Once
we understand this, he will triumphantly conclude (expecting us to be
able to deal on our own with our third example), we will see that all
laws are indeed commands. For, as is by now clear, in his view the
court's statement that every person has a right to personal security is
not a statement of one law but a summary reference to many. The
court in its reasoning alludes to the laws against murder, assault, and
false imprisonment, among others, and to the laws commanding violators of these to pay damages.
It would probably be generally accepted that our philosopher friend
is mistaken, that not all laws are commands. He is mistaken not because he is employing principles of individuation, but because he has
accepted the wrong principles. Every theory about the logical types
of laws presupposes a doctrine of the individuation of laws, and for
the most part it can be attacked or defended only by attacking or defending its underlying doctrine of individuation. There is no need
to tackle here the problem of the individuation of laws in general. 0
It is, however, very important to be constantly aware of it when dis9. I have tried to do this elsewhere. J. RAz, supra note 5.
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cussing the status of principles. If we do this we will soon realize that
not everything which looks like a legal principle is a legal principle,
at least not in the sense that Professor Dworkin has in mind.
We often have need to refer summarily to a body of legal rules without specifying their content in detail. Such references are frequently
made by courts in the course of justifying their decisions. These references usually take the form of a statement of a principle, but they
are not statements of the content of laws of a special type, namely legal
principles. They are merely a brief allusion to a number of rules.
Someone may say that in his country the principle of freedom of speech
is recognized by law. When asked what he means he may say that the
only laws setting limits to the liberty to express opinions are concerned
with libel and military security; that censorship of films, books and
the theatre must be justified by the protection of infants; that there
are detailed regulations guaranteeing access to the mass media to
people representing all shades of opinions on public matters; and so
on. His statement that in his country freedom of speech is recognized
by law can thus be seen to be a summary reference to a great number
of laws, not a statement of the content of a single law. Another person, by contrast, may say that a certain legal system incorporates the
principle of freedom of speech because it contains a law instructing
the courts and all public officials to protect freedom of speech in all
cases, even those not governed by particular rules. This person's statement is a statement of the content of one particular law, and it is a
principle in the sense in which Professor Dworkin employs the term.
It imposes an obligation and thus guides the action of courts and
officials.
Professor Dworkin is only dimly aware of the problem of individuation. He does say that not every statement of a rule is a complete
description of it.10 Many such statements omit many of the exceptions
which are part of the rule and which must be included in any complete
statement of its content. He is, however, completely oblivious to the
importance of the doctrine of individuation to a discussion of principles. In particular, he disregards the fact that some statements by
courts which look like statements of legal principles are in fact no
more than abbreviated references to a number of legal rules. It seems
to me, to take just one of Professor Dworkin's examples of principles,
that a court's statement that freedom of contract is not such an im.
10. Dworkin, supra nofe 2, at 25 [37].
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mutable doctrine as to admit of no qualification"x is merely a reference
to the fact that there are rules qualifying the freedom of contract and
there is a rule granting the courts power to introduce further qualifications. (The exercise of this power is subject to principles guiding
the discretion of the courts in general. But these principles are distinct
from the power granted to the courts.)
The first lesson to be drawn from applying the doctrine of individuation to the discussion of legal principles is that the apparent multiplicity of principles is deceptive. Some apparent statements of prin.
ciple are merely abbreviated references to a number of laws, not statements of the content of one complete legal principle.
B.

Conflicts Among Laws
Bentham, Austin and many others assumed that valid laws do not
conflict. They knew, of course, that conflicting statutory provisions
and conflicting judicial opinions can easily be found, but they believed that in such cases what is valid are only the laws to the extent
to which they do not conflict. In a complete representation of the law
of a country all conflicts are resolved by the application of legal rules
and principles such as that lex posteriorderogat priori.The principles
of individuation should be so framed to ensure that laws do not conflict. A single law may include many limitative and exceptive provisions, to use Bentham's terminology, qualifying the application of its
main provision, and ensuring that it does not conflict with other laws.
But one law may not conflict with, and thus qualify, another law.
This is not, however, the way we ordinarily think of the relation
between non-legal rules and principles. We know not only that principles like "maximize total happiness" and "strive to increase equality"
may conflict when applied to particular cases, but also that rules may
sometimes conflict as well. Sometimes one can keep one's promise
only by telling a lie. We do not normally think that such conflicts
are merely apparent and that each rule in fact includes qualifications
such as "keep your promise unless this entails telling a lie." We believe that sometimes we should lie rather than break a promise and
sometimes we should break a promise rather than tell a lie, and although what we should do depends on general considerations there
is no way of setting all of them down beforehand. We can attend to
many problems only when they arise; we are unable to decide what
11. Id. at 24 [36].
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to do solely on the basis of previously accepted rules. We are on the
whole reconciled to the fact that rules may conflict and that they
impose obligations which may be overridden in particular cases by
12
contrary considerations.
Professor Dworkin adopts an intermediate position on this issue.
Legal rules, he claims, do not conflict whereas legal principles do.
Indeed, he turns this into the first distinguishing characteristic between legal rules and principles:
The difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical
distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular decisions
about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable
in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given,
then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies
must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing
to the decision. 13
This means, as Professor Dworkin explains, that if a legal rule stipulates that a certain act ought to be done in certain conditions, then,
given that in a particular situation the conditions obtain, the act
ought to be done. It cannot be argued that it ought not because of a
second legal rule which qualifies the first, for on Professor Dworkin's
account a legal rule includes all its exceptions and cannot conflict
with another rule. "If two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a
valid rule."' 1 This distinguishes legal rules from legal principles, since
the latter may conflict.
This leads Professor Dworkin to the second distinguishing mark of
legal principles, which is entailed by the first. Legal principles have
certain relative "weights." Some have greater weight than others.
This dimension of weight determines what ought to be done in cases
to which conflicting principles apply. "When principles intersect...
one who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative
weight of each."' 15 Since rules do not conflict they do not have this
dimension of weight.
I would like to suggest that legal rules may conflict and have
weights, and that therefore Professor Dworkin's remarks should not
12. Some philosophers dispute this view, but this is not the place to discuss the gen.

cral problem in detail. For a convincing argument in favor of the view expressed here,
see Singer, Moral Rules and Principles, in ESSAYS
Melden ed. 1958).
13. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 25 [37].
14. Id. at 27 [40].
15. Id. at 27 [39].

IN MORAL PHlLOSOPHY

160, 167 (A.
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be regarded as defining the characteristics of rules and principles. The
issue here turns on which principles of individuation it would be best
to adopt. It is possible to devise principles of individuation which
guarantee that every rule includes all its qualifications and that no
rules ever conflict with each other. But it would be wrong to accept
such principles of individuation. The point at issue can best be illustrated by an example. The criminal law includes a rule prohibiting
assault. This rule is qualified by various other laws. 16 Assault is permitted in self-defense, in carrying out lawful orders, in cases of necessity. The rule is also qualified by general laws determining the territorial sphere of validity of the bulk of the laws of the legal system
concerned. One might wish to claim, as did Bentham, for example,
that no statement of the law against assault is a complete description
of that law unless it enumerates all these qualifications. One may claim
that the qualifying laws are not separate laws but only parts of the
law prohibiting assault. To do so would be to accept a very misguided
doctrine of the individuation of laws.
Consider the consequences of accepting this view of the individuation of laws. It will mean, of course, that not only the law against
assault but also the laws against homicide, rape, and theft, and every
other law, Will include these and many other qualifying clauses. We
will have fewer laws (the doctrine of self-defense, for example, will
not be regarded as separate), but those which remain will be enormously complex. They will also be very repetitive, having much of
their content in common (the doctrine of self-defense, for example,
will be a part of each of the criminal laws).
To accept such a doctrine of individuation is to misunderstand the
function of the principles of individuation. Because of the vast amount
of legal material which constitutes one legal system, we need to divide
it into smaller units called "laws" in order to be able to refer separately
to parts of the total legal system. The principles of individuation are
the method of carving small and manageable units out of the total
legal material in a way which will promote our understanding of the
law by classifying laws into various types and by showing how these
laws interrelate and interact with one another. The principles of individuation which are necessary to avoid conflicts among laws yield enormously complex laws which are relatively independent; their inter16. The definitions of "assault" and sonic other offenses often include e.\prvssions
such as "wrongful" and "unlawful." Such words serve to draw attention to the fact that
these rules may conflict with other laws which qualify them.
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action with other laws is minimized; they are made to be as selfsufficient as possible. This relative independence is acquired at the
cost of making each law very bulky; each is derived from a great number of statutes and cases; and they become repetitive. These were also,
as we have seen above, the consequences of denying the status of a
separate law to the laws conferring powers to legislate or make wills.
For these reasons (among others) we must reject any doctrine of
individuation which strives to avoid any conflict of rules by making
them so much more complex and repetitive.
Instead we should adopt a doctrine of individuation which keeps
laws to a manageable size, avoids repetition, minimizes the need to
refer to a great variety of statutes and cases as the sources of a single
law, and does not deviate unnecessarily from the (admittedly hazy)
common sense notion of a law. Such a doctrine of individuation will
result in a greater number of laws which interact with one another,
modifying and qualifying each other. This approach is closer to the
way lawyers ordinarily think about the law, and also illuminates important connections among laws. It focuses attention on the fact that
certain groups of laws are affected by certain other laws stipulating
doctrines such as self-defense, necessity, etc., while others are not. In
short, such a doctrine of individuation better explains the systematic
interrelations between various parts of the legal system.
The result is that laws which are not principles may conflict. It is
because they conflict or "interact" (to use Professor Dworkin's phrase)
that they can modify and qualify one another. Consequently, Professor
Dworkin is wrong in holding that principles can be distinguished from
other laws because only they can conflict.
This still leaves Professor Dworkin's second point, relating to the
"weight" of legal principles, untouched. Legal rules might arguably
lack the dimension of weight even though they conflict. But perhaps
talking of "weight" here is misleading. Since laws which are not principles conflict, the legal system includes some means of resolving such
conflicts. But these means usually determine which one of any two
conflicting laws prevails, and the same law always prevails when the
two conflict. The law instituting self-defense or mistake of fact as an
excuse always overrides the law prohibiting assault. With principles
the situation is different. That one principle has more weight, is more
important than another, does not entail that whenever they conflict
(assuming that no other principle is involved) one ought to follow
the more important principle. In determining what is to be done in
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every case, or type of case, the importance of the principles has to be
considered in relation to the amount of good or harm done to the
ends they seek to promote. In one case, or type of case, for example,
one possible solution may greatly advance the goal of the less important
principle, while doing only little harm to the goal of the more important principle. The alternative solutions may cause a great deal
of damage to the goal of the less important principle while promoting only slightly the goal of the more important principle. In such
cases the less important principle is to be preferred. In other cases the
calculation may be different.
By somewhat modifying Professor Dworkin's second point, one
might claim that though both rules and principles have relative
weights, they behave differently in many instances of conflict. Conflicts between rules are determined solely by their relative importance;
conflicts between principles are determined by assessing their relative
importance together with the consequences for their goals of various
courses of action. It seems to me that this is a correct observation of
one important difference between rules and principles (in one sense
of "principles") in most legal systems. It would be wrong, however,
to regard this as a logical difference between rules and principles, or
to take this feature to be a defining characteristic of principles.
First let us observe that there are some types of conflicts in which
rules behave like principles. These are cases in which a rule conflicts
with a principle. Such conflicts are, of course, possible on Professor
Dworkin's account. He thinks that once they are brought before a
court they may be resolved by amending the rule to avoid future conflicts. This sometimes happens, but at least before the court's decision
and often, as I shall argue below, later, rules do conflict with principles. Such conflicts can be resolved either on the basis of the relative importance of the conflicting laws, disregarding the consequences
for each law's goal of the possible solutions (and thus treating the
principle as a legal rule is normally treated), or by taking into account
both the relative importance of the laws and the consequences for the
goals of each of the possible solutions (and treating the legal rule in
the way legal principles alone are usually treated). In most cases
(though not in all) the second method is followed; but, regardless of
which method is used, it is apparent that in these conflicts rules and
principles are treated in exactly the same way." T
17. Naturally, the assessment of the importance of a rule and of the consequences for
its goal of various deviations from it depends largely on the reasons for the rule, which
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This observation does not deny that legal rules and principles sometimes behave differently in cases of conflict, and does not preclude
one from making this difference the defining characteristic of principles. But it detracts from the attractiveness of such a definition. The
reason for rejecting the suggested definition depends on the fact that
rules and principles are not exclusively legal concepts. We distinguish
between rules and principles in morals and other non-legal spheres.
A definition of legal "rules" and "principles" which accounts for the
non-legal use of these terms is preferable to any definition which does
not fit their non-legal usage. It is quite clear that in many non-legal
contexts rules and principles behave in conflict in precisely the same
way-the way characteristic of the legal treatment of principles. This
is not the place to argue this point at any length. Let us just remind
ourselves of the conflict between the rules concerning lying and promising. When such conflicts occur we decide what we ought to do not
merely by declaring that one rule is more important than the other
and is always to be preferred, but by comparing the good and harm
to the values protected by them in every case or type of case, sometimes preferring to follow one rule and break the other, sometimes
preferring the opposite. I therefore suggest that the logical difference
between rules and principles has nothing to do with the possibility
of conflict or the way such conflicts are to be resolved. The different
treatment of legal rules and principles in cases of conflict is not entailed by their logical differences but is a result of a legal policy. What
that policy is we will be able to see after we establish the logical difference between these types of law.
C. Rules and PrinciplesDistinguished
The distinction between rules and principles, as Professor Dworkin
rightly observes, is a logical one. Legal rules and legal principles are
laws of a different logical type. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that all the laws ordinarily called "rules" are of the same logical
type, or that all the laws called "principles" are of the same type.1 8
are sometimes that it promotes the ends of certain legal principles. But in precisely

the same way the importance of legal principles and of deviations from them depends on
the reasons for the principles-which are sometimes other legal principles. Compare, for
example, the relation between the following two principles mentioned by Professor
Dworkin: "[T]he courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity
and injustice." "[T]he courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of
a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities
of the other." Id. at 24 [36].

18. Non-legal rules and principles are also of a variety of logical types, but this need

not concern us here.
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Compare the rule prohibiting assault or the rule, mentioned by Professor Dworkin, that "[t]he maximum legal speed on the turnpike is
sixty miles an hour," with the other rule he mentions, that "[a] will
is invalid unless signed by three witnesses."101 The first two rules erect
prohibitions. They are legal norms guiding human behavior by pro.
scribing a certain course of action. The third rule neither prohibits
any action nor does it impose an obligation to behave in any way. It
is not even a power-conferring rule (this being a type of rule distinct
from duty-imposing rules), for it does not confer the power to make
wills nor does it confer the power to witness wills. There are other
rules conferring these powers on certain classes of persons. The rule
itself qualifies the rule conferring power to make wills; it makes the
successful exercise of this power depend on three witnesses having
signed the will.20 Such rules, and there are many of them, are not
norms, they do not guide behavior directly by providing reasons for
action as duty-imposing or power-conferring rules do. Rather they
affect one's reasons for action indirectly by qualifying the meaning
or application of laws which are norms. 2 '
Laws which are not norms are a most important category of laws.
They have been neglected by most legal philosophers, who refuse
to concede that not all laws guide behavior directly, that instead many
guide it indirectly through their logical relations with other laws which
are norms. Some of the laws which are not norms are often referred
to as "principles." This is particularly true of those laws which govern a vast area of law: that is, those which are logically related to a
great number of other laws, qualifying them and modifying their
application. Thus the law determining the territorial sphere of validity of most of a country's law (which is clearly not itself a norm) is
often referred to as a principle. It is not, however, a principle in the
sense in which Professor Dworkin uses this term. (In cases of conflict, for example, it behaves like a rule.) Professor Dworkin is interested in principles which are norms; his principles are principles of
obligation, they are standards which "point to particular decisions
22
about legal obligations in particular circumstances.
19.

Id. at 25

[37].

20. One may argue that it is not a separate law at all but merely part of the rule
conferring power to make wills. I will assume that tie principles of individuation. for
reasons similar to those discussed above, permit one to regard this rule as a separate
law. See pp. 831-32 supra.
21. It should be noted that rules may conflict not only with rules of different logical
type but also with rules of the same type. Compare the conflict between the rules concerning lying and promising.
22. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 25 [37].
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The task of analyzing the various categories of legal and non-legal
principles is a considerable one. I am only concerned to point out that
not all legal principles are of the type discussed by Professor Dworkin.
In the analysis I propose I shall follow him in concentrating attention
exclusively on principles of obligation, and in trying to distinguish
them, not from all other types of laws, but only from rules of obligation, the type they resemble most closely.
Rules and principles of obligation are similar; for, as Professor
Dworkin rightly observes, it is "not always clear from the form of a
standard whether it is a rule or a principle. '2 3 Each states a reason
that "argues in one direction. '24 That is to say, each states that a certain class of persons (the "norm-subject") ought to perform a certain
act (the "norm-act") in certain circumstances (the "conditions of
application"). 25 The "ought" in both cases is a prima facie "ought,"
pointing to a reason for action, not an "ought all things considered."
For both rules and principles may be overridden in certain circumstances by other rules and principles or by other reasons. Professor
Dworkin creates the impression that the norm-subjects of all legal
principles are the courts. 26 But other people and institutions may also
be the norm-subjects of principles (though it is true that legal principles, like all other laws, are enforced by the courts). One such example mentioned by Professor Dworkin himself is the American constitutional principle that Congress shall not abridge freedom of speech.
Another example is the common law principle of the law of negligence, addressed to all the population and prescribing a duty of
27
reasonable care.

Principles are often stated in ways which leave their subjects unspecified. The statement of the principle, mentioned by Professor Dworkin,
that an automobile "manufacturer is under a special obligation in
connection with the construction, promotion and sale of his cars, "28
makes clear that its subjects are automobile manufacturers. It is less
clear whether another principle he mentions, that "no one may profit
from his own wrong," 29 is addressed to the public at large or to the
23. Id. at 28 [40].
24. Id. at 26 [38].
25. This terminology is derived from G.H. VON WMicnr, NORM AND AarioN chi 5
(1963).
26. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 2, at 29-31 [41-44].
27. I shall argue below that Professor Dworkin is wrong in denying (id. at 28-29
[40-41]) that this is a principle. See pp. 841-42.
28. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 26-27 [39].
29. Id. at 25-26 [37-38].
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courts. A more detailed statement of the principle is needed to determine that. That ordinary statements of principles do not set out in
detail all their content should surprise no one, and should not lead
to the conclusion that the omitted parts do not exist. In the statement
of principles their relative weight is seldom mentioned. Similarly, the
conditions of application of principles are sometimes omitted. Some
principles are universal in the sense that the norm-act ought to be
done whenever there is an opportunity to do so, while others are to
be applied only in certain circumstances.
The conditions of application of a principle are not automatically
narrowed by the fact that it conflicts with an established rule. The
principle that no one may benefit from his wrong always applied to
murderers inheriting by the will of the murdered person, despite the
fact that their right to inherit was protected until 1889 by a rule. It
is because it always applied to such cases that the court in Riggs v.
Palmer30 could, as Professor Dworkin reminds us,3 ' make an exception to the rule in the case of a murderer. Since principles apply to
cases which are regulated by contrary rules, one cannot observe that
words like "reasonable" and "unjust" make "the application of the
rule which contains [them] depend to some extent upon principles
...and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle" and
then argue that it is nevertheless only a rule because each of "these
terms restricts the kind of other principles on which the rule depends."3 2 In general, all rules are subject to all principles and may
be overridden by any of them in particular circumstances. This is indeed one of the main points which Professor Dworkin is rightly
anxious to establish. If a law establishing standards of reasonableness
is a rule, then it is liable to be overridden by principles like any other.
It is hardly plausible to suggest that the function of words like "reasonable" is to immunize the law against general considerations embodied in certain principles. Their function is to do precisely the
opposite. It is true that laws prohibiting unreasonable restraints of
trade or damage done by negligence do not in themselves embody or
refer to all the considerations embodied in all the principles of law;
but no principle does either. They are principles of exactly the same
nature as the principle, mentioned by Professor Dworkin, that "the
courts must examine purchase agreements [of automobiles] closely to
30. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
31. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 29 [41-42].
32. Id. at 28-29 [41].
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see if consumer and public interests are treated fairly," or the other
principle he quotes, that the courts generally refuse to enforce a bargain in which "one party has unjustly taken advantage" of another.83
They are principles, and like every principle embody one consideration or set of considerations which, though of very great weight in
their own sphere, are to compete in particular cases with other more
general principles.
The distinction between rules and principles of obligation both in
law and outside it turns on the character of the norm-act prescribed.
Rules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles prescribe highly unspecific actions. Generic acts, types of acts, are of various degrees of
specificity. An act is highly unspecific if it can be performed on different occasions by the performance of a great many heterogeneous
generic acts on each occasion. It is more specific to the extent to which
there is only a small number of generic acts by the performance of
which it is performed. Smoking is a highly specific act which is performed by smoking a pipe, a cigarette or a cigar, but not by many
other generic acts. Assault, murder, rape, and speeding are likewise
relatively specific acts. Promoting human happiness, respecting human
dignity, increasing productivity, and behaving negligently or unjustly
or unreasonably are highly unspecific acts. It is because of this that
we say rules prescribe or proscribe the first class of acts, whereas principles prescribe the second (to the extent that these types of behavior
are governed by norms at all). The distinction between rules and
principles is, on this analysis, one of degree, since there is no hard
and fast line between acts which are specific and those which are unspecific. Consequently, there will be many borderline cases where it
will be impossible to say that we definitely have a rule or definitely
a principle.
The suggestion that it is this logical distinction between the type
of norm-acts prescribed which underlies much of our ordinary usage
of the terms "rules" and "principles" may be greeted with some suspicion. We feel that rules and principles play different roles in practical reasoning whether in the law or outside it and that the suggested
distinction does not seem to explain this. In fact, however, the logical
distinction does explain some of these differences and it indicates how
to explain the rest.
Since highly unspecific acts can be performed by performing on
33. Id. at 24 [36].
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different occasions a variety of more specific acts, the opportunities
for performing them encompass the opportunities for performing the
more specific acts and are more general than the latter. Norms prescribing highly unspecific acts, consequently, must be justified by
more general considerations bearing on a wider area of human activity. Since we justify considerations which apply to a limited range
of situations and actions by more general considerations, principles
can be used to justify rules but not vice versa. This is, perhaps, the
most important difference in the role of rules and principles in practical reasoning in general, and it can be explained by means of the
distinction I have suggested. This does not explain all the differences
between rules and principles in the lawv. These, though dependent
on the logical distinction, do not derive from it alone. They depend
also on various constraints imposed by general legal policies and goals.
D.

The Role of Principlesin the Law
Let me start with a brief survey of five different purposes for which
principles are used in the law. I will then make a general comment
on their relation to other laws. The extent to which principles are
used for these different purposes varies greatly among different legal
systems. Even within one legal system some principles are used for
all of them, while others are restricted to a few; and in some branches
of the law principles are relied on more extensively than in others.
I will not try to analyze in detail the role of principles in any particular legal system. My aim is only to isolate some of the different
tasks principles may be assigned. These tasks are of a very general
nature. Further subdivisions are needed for a complete account of
the functions of principles. I will introduce one subdivision in a later
section, but otherwise I shall restrict myself to the more general categories. Though the tasks identified can be performed by various types
of principles, I shall as before confine the discussion to principles of
obligation.
1. Principles as grounds for interpreting laws. This is perhaps the
most extensive and least inhibited use to which virtually all principles
are put. Principles are used for the interpretation of all laws, including other principles of a more restricted application. There is a very
strong presumption in most legal systems that other things being equal
an interpretation which makes a law conform to a principle is to be
preferred to one which does not. Obviously, some interpretations
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often conform better to some principles than others, and the courts
have to decide which interpretation to prefer. This role of principles
is of the utmost importance since it is a crucial device for ensuring
coherence of purpose among various laws bearing on the same subject.
The importance of this function of principles can be gathered by
comparing various legal systems which, despite great similarity in their
rules, reach different conclusions in many cases because they apply
different principles for their interpretation.
2. Principles as grounds for changing laws. The first function of
principles merges into the second, since the borderline between an
interpretation of a law and its amendment is notoriously a blurred
one. Nevertheless the two functions are distinct, and it is not difficult
to distinguish between them in the majority of cases. The doctrine
of precedent, where accepted, commonly includes the understanding
that laws developed through precedent are subject to amendment by
the use of principles. This does not mean that judge-made rules are
often upset; for, as Professor Dworkin reminds us, principles are often
conservative in nature. Subordinate legislation is also subjected to
relatively extensive review in light of legal principles. Though subordinate legislation, unlike judge-made law, is often amended on the
ground of being in conflict with principles, it is seldom annulled for
that reason. Many legal systems, however, stipulate that subordinate
legislation must stand some test of reasonableness, thus rendering it
void or voidable if it contradicts very fundamental principles. Principles are used much more sparingly when parliamentary legislation
is concerned, except in countries which have a formal constitution
from which certain principles can be shown to derive.
3. Principlesas grounds for particular,exceptidri# to laws. Sometimes
a law is not applied to a case on which it bears- on the ground that to
do so in those particular circumstances would sacrifice important
principles; but the law is not thereby modified. This may often occur
in countries where the doctrine of precedent is not recognized but
where principles are allowed to override rules in particular circumstances. In common law countries this use of principles is more restricted, but nonetheless of considerable importance. The principle
of laches, for example, is one of a group of principles of equity which
is characteristically used in this way. In contrast we may remember
that the principle "no one may profit from his own wrong" is characteristically used in the second manner described earlier, i.e., as ground
for changing and qualifying rules.
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4. Principles as grounds for making new rules. When principles but
no other laws apply to a certain range of problems, courts act to regulate the area by making new rules. This is a very important way in
which the common law develops: new rules are made on the basis
of established principles.
5. Principlesas the sole ground for action in particularcases. There
are situations in which what ought legally to be done is determined
directly by the application of various principles to the case. This
function of principles is radically different from those previously
mentioned, for here principles do not operate through the mediation
of rules. They are not grounds for the interpretation or modification
of rules, nor do they compete with them or serve as grounds for creating them. It is easy to underestimate the extent to which principles
are used in this way in most countries. The whole area of sentencing
is governed almost exclusively by principles. The activities of public
officials and administrative agencies are larely governed by principles in this fashion. The law confers certain powers on the agency
and directs it to use them to promote certain policy goals in accordance
with general principles. The exercise of discretionary powers is typically guided by principles rather than rules.
It is true, nevertheless, that on the whole there is a marked tendency
in the law of many countries not to rely on the direct application of
principles but to use them to govern the operation of rules in the ways
indicated above. This is particularly true when individuals rather
than courts and officials are the norm-subjects of the principles.
Some of the reasons for preferring rules to principles in the direct
regulation of behavior have to do with the particular 'conditions of
various countries or of different branches of the law. But at least one
general reason for this preference is fairly obvious. Principles, because
they prescribe highly unspecific acts, tend to be more -vague and less
certain than rules. On the other hand, and for the same reason, they
are particularly suitable for incorporating into the law very general
goals and values, whereas rules are more apt to reflect more concrete
considerations which apply to particular situations.
Since the law should strive to balance certainty and reliability
against flexibility, it is on the whole wise legal policy to use rules as
much as possible for regulating human behavior because they are
more certain than principles and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application. It is on the whole advisable to limit
the use of principles to govern the creation and application of rules
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in order to ensure adequate flexibility in changing them and to prevent some of their unforeseen and undesirable effects. Some areas, such
as governmental activities, cannot be adequately regulated by rules,
and they must be directly governed by principles. But these cases are
exceptional. Since in the use of rules the premium should be on certainty, whereas in the use of principles the premium is on flexibility,
it is wise to accept relatively simple methods of resolving conflicts
between rules which will not detract from the predictability of their
application. No similar reasons apply to the methods of resolving conflicts between principles. This explains the difference noted above
between the treatment of rules and principles in cases of conflict. The
difference stems from reasons of legal policy. It is not a logical difference between the concepts of a rule and a principle.
In fact, all the comments made in this section concerning the rela,
tive roles of rules and principles apply only to their use in the law
and similar institutions and are not entailed by the concepts of a rule
and a principle. In morality, Where certainty and uniformity are generally less valued than correctness of judgment, rules have a much
more limited role to play than in the law. Principles are to be regarded as governing directly most' occasions for action and judgment
affected by moral considerations. For the same reason conflicts of rules
and conflicts of principles are not, in moral assessments, treated
differently.
II.

Principles and the Limits of Law

By the thesis of the "limits of law" I ,fnean the position that there
is a test which distinguishes what is law from what is not. Professor
Dworkin's writings in effect contain three arguments, each of which
is partly dependent on his theory of principles, against the thesis of
the limits of law. 34 While only two of these arguments are explicitly
directed against this thesis, all of them, if valid, undermine it. In the
remainder of this article I shall show that each of Professor Dworkin's
arguments must fail and that there is good reason to persevere in the
34. "The Model of Rules" is perhaps not altogether clear that all forms of the thesis
of the limits of law are to be rejected, though it plainly opposes one version of the thesis
by rejecting the tenet "that the law of a community is distinguished from other social
standards by some test in the form of a mnaster rule." Id. at 45 [59]. Professor Dworkin
has, however, confirmed to me in conversation that these arguments are directed against
the thesis of the limits of the law generally and has taken such a position in his lectures
at Oxford University in 1971.
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attempt to construct a test for distinguishing what is law from what
is not. I hope in the course of this discussion to throw some light on
how such seemingly disparate matters as the thesis of the limits of
law, the nature of rules and principles, the role of judicial discretion,
and the criterion of the identity of a legal system are related.
A.

JudicialDiscretion

Professor Dworkin's first argument is a result of his theory of judicial discretion. 35 He distinguishes three senses of discretion. In the
two weak senses "discretion" means "judgment" and "finality." "Sometimes," explains Professor Dworkin,
we use "discretion" in a weak sense, simply to say that for some
reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied
mechanically but demand the use of judgment....
Sometimes we use the term in a different weak sense, to say
only that some official has final authority to make a decision and
cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other official....
I call both of these senses weak to distinguish them from a
stronger sense. We use "discretion" sometimes ...

to say that on

some issue [an official] is simply not bound by standards set by
the authority in question."0
The thesis that judges have discretion in the strong sense3 t means that
there are cases which they are legally entitled to decide and in which
no one correct decision is determined by standards of law. The thesis
of judicial discretion does not entail that in cases where discretion
may be exercised anything goes. Such cases are governed by laws
which rule out certain decisions. The only claim is that the laws do
not determine any decision as the correct one.
Professor Dworkin argues that (1) the law includes some principles
as well as rules. From this he concludes that (2) the courts never
have discretion in the strong sense. It follows, though he does not
draw the conclusion at this point, that (8) the thesis of the limits of
law is wrong. I shall argue that (3) does indeed follow from (2), but
that (2) does not follow from (1) and is in any case wrong.
35. See Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PNu. 624 (1963). Profcssor Divorkin has
reformulated his theory in "The Model of Rules" (see Dworkin, supra note 2. at 3240
[44-54]) to meet some of the objections raised by G.C. MacCallum, Jr., ini his reply to
Dworkin's first paper. See MacCallum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 638
(1963).
36. Dworkin, supra note 2,at 32-33 [45.46].
37. I shall henceforth be concerned only with "discretion" in this sense, and only
this sense is involved in what I shall call the "thesis of judicial discretion."
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If courts are never entitled to exercise discretion (in the strong
sense) it follows that all the reasons, rules and principles which they
are entitled to rely on are part of the law. There is one important
exception to this conclusion; those standards which are applied because they are the standards of some other legal system or organization, the standards of which the law respects and enforces, are not
part of the law. The exception covers those laws of other states which
are recognized and enforced according to the rules of private international law. It also extends to contracts and the rules of voluntary
associations recognized by law, and to social, moral and religious
standards of individuals and communities which are taken into account for some legal purposes (such as mitigation of punishment or
exemption from military service) or as creating presumptions of fact
as to the behavior or intention of litigants. When referring to such
standards in their judgments the courts quite clearly do so not because they are part of the law but because the law makes it its business to recognize and give support, to a certain extent, to standards
38
of other organizations, communities or individuals.
This exception apart (and, however important, it does not affect
Professor Dworkin's case against the thesis of the limits of law), it
follows from Professor Dworkin's views on judicial discretion that
all the reasons which the courts are entitled to use in justifying decisions are part of the law. All the reasons for a decision are legal reasons, for the law uniquely determines which decision is the correct
one. 30 Now it seems to me true that on various occasions the courts
are entitled to rely on every reason which is endorsed by part of the
community for some purpose or other. It follows, therefore, from
Professor Dworkin's view on judicial discretion that the thesis of the
limits of law is wrong at least to the extent to which it claims that
it is possible to distinguish between the law and non-legal social
standards.
If, on the other hand, courts do have discretion, then in cases in
which they are entitled to exercise discretion they act on standards
which are not part of the law. Therefore, though every social standard may figure in a court's decision, it does not follow that all of them
are laws. The opportunity is given to those who support the thesis
38. On this problem see Raz, The Identity of Legal Systems, 59 CALIF. L. RLV. 795
(1971.)
39. The courts may occasionally rely on the wrong reasons. I am concerned here only
with the reasons which they are entitled to use.
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of the limits of law to draw a distinction between the standards used
by courts which are law and those which are not. How is one to decide whether courts do or do not have discretion?
Professor Dworkin is primarily concerned to argue that there are
legally binding principles. But this has never been denied by anyone,
least of all by the positivists. Indeed, Austin could not have denied
that some principles are legally binding while remaining true to his
theory of law. The most fundamental tenet of his theory is that the
commands of a sovereign are law, and there is nothing to prevent a
sovereign from commanding that a principle shall be binding. Professor Dworkin's mistake lies in assuming that when Austin was talking about commands he was referring to what Professor Dworkin calls
rules. But this is not the case. Neither does Hart use "rules" in the
same sense as Professor Dworkin. By "rules" he means what Professor
Dworkin seems to mean by "standards," namely rules, principles or
any other type of norm (whether legal or social).40
The crux of the argument lies in the inference that since some
principles are law judicial discretion does not exist. Professor Dworkin
says very little on this. The reason, I suspect, is that he rightly sees
that other theorists, not only the positivists, exaggerated the scope
of judicial discretion because they failed to attend to the role principles play in the law. They tended to assume that whenever a rule
is vague the court has discretion and did not see that sometimes the
rule when read in light of some principles is not vague and does not
leave room for discretion. "A set of principles," as Professor Dworkin
reminds us, "can dictate a result.' 4' But that it sometimes can does
not mean that it always does. And it is this that Professor Dworkin
has to establish to make his case against judicial discretion. Unfortunately, he does not even try to establish this point.
I suppose that there might be a legal system which contains a rule
that whenever the courts are faced with a case for which the law does
not provide a uniquely correct solution they ought to refuse to render judgment. In such a system there would be no judicial discretion.
But, whether or not such a system can exist, few if any legal systems
in fact contain such a rule. In most legal systems there are at least
40. Of course both Austin and Hart would maintain that Some principIlk are not

part of the law. But this is no more than to say that they believe in he thesis of the
limits of law. It should be noted that I am using "'standards" to cover not only norms
but also generally accepted reasons for action.
41. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 36 [49] (emphasis in original).
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three different sources of judicial discretion. Let me survey them
briefly.
1. Vagueness. Vagueness is inherent in language. It is a problem
courts have to face very frequently. As noted above, principles as well
as rules of interpretation can sometimes solve problems of vagueness
without leaving room for discretion. But principles themselves are
vague, and discretion in cases of vagueness cannot be dispensed with
so long as courts are entitled to render judgment in such cases.
2. Weight. Though principles sometimes limit the scope of the
courts' discretion, they tend on the whole to expand it. For reasons
noted earlier 4 2 the law usually determines with precision the relative
weight of rules. Not so with principles. The law characteristically
includes only incomplete indications as to their relative weight and
leaves much to judicial discretion to be exercised in particular cases.
The scope of discretion is in fact doubly extended, since not only must
the relative importance of principles be determined, but also the importance relative to each principle of deviating from it or of following
it on particular occasions. This matter is usually entrusted to judicial
discretion.
That courts have discretion as to weight does not, of course, mean
that the law has nothing to contribute to the solution of the case. It
contributes some of the elements for a solution, but not all the elements necessary to dictate a uniquely correct solution. In such cases
the law dictates what considerations have to be taken into account,
but not what weight to assign to each of them or to actions in accordance with or contrary to each of them in particular cases.
3. Laws of discretion. Most legal systems contain laws granting
courts discretion, not only as to the weight of legally binding considerations, but also to act on considerations which are not legally
binding. Such discretion may be, and usually is, guided by principles.
These principles, however, do not dictate the considerations to be
taken into account, but merely limit the range of the considerations.
One may distinguish between substantive principles, which dictate
a goal to be pursued or a value to be protected, and principles of discretion, which guide discretion by stipulating what type of goals and
values the judge may take into account in exercising his discretion.
Compare the following two sets of hypothetical principles. (a) "Car
manufacturers have a duty to protect the public from accidents." "In42. See pp. 832-42 supra.
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creased productivity and efficiency should be the prime objective of
public corporations." "The validity of standard contracts is contingent
on their not taking advantage of the economic necessities of the
weaker party." "The law favors security of title." (b) "The courts
will not enforce unjust contracts." "Public corporations should act
for the general good." "Whatever is contra bonos mores el decorum
the principles of our law prohibit." The first group of principles set
particular considerations to be acted on. They may be vague and they
do not specify the weight to be given to each consideration, but the
consideration prescribed is clear enough and is not a matter left to the
courts' discretion. Principles of the second group, on the other hand,
do not stipulate what considerations should be acted on. They merely
specify the type of considerations which may be taken into account
and leave the rest to the officials or the courts addressed by the principles. Rather than negating discretion, they presuppose its existence
and guide it. What is "unjust" or "for the general good" is a matter
of opinion and the courts or officials concerned are instructed by la,
to act on their own views. The law does not impose its own views of
justice or the common good. Rather, it leaves the matter to the discretion of the courts or the officials. Many of the principles governing
the action of the courts and the executive are principles of discretion. 43
Such principles, far from proving the absence of judicial discretion,
are a manifestation of a legal policy to rely on and make use of judicial
and administrative discretion in order to increase the flexibility of the
law and improve the procedures for its constant review to meet
changes in circumstance and opinion.
We must conclude that legal principles do not exclude judicial discretion; they presuppose its existence and direct and guide it. The
argument from the absence of judicial discretion against the thesis
of the limits of law must therefore be rejected. It should be noted,
however, that judicial discretion is not arbitrary judgment. Courts are
never allowed to act arbitrarily. Even when discretion is not limited
or guided in any specific direction the courts are still legally bound
to act as they think is best according to their beliefs and values. If
they do not, if they give arbitrary judgment by tossing a coin, for
example, they violate a legal duty. A judge must always invoke some
general reasons. He has no discretion when the reasons are dictated
by law. He has discretion when the law requires him to act on reasons
43. Many of the principles mentioned by Professor Dworkin arc of this kind.
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which he thinks are correct, instead of imposing its own standards.
When discretion is denied the law dictates which standards should
be applied by all the judges. When discretion is allowed each judge
is entitled to follow different reasons but he must believe that they
are the best. Otherwise, discretion can be equated only with arbitrariness, whim, and caprice.
B.

"Sources" of Legal Principles

Legal principles, like other laws, can be enacted or repealed by
legislatures and administrative authorities. They can also become
legally binding through establishment by the courts. Many legal systems recognize that both rules and principles can be made into law
or lose their status as law through precedent. Rules and principles
differ in this respect. A court can establish a new rule in a single
judgment which becomes a precedent. Principles are not made into law
by a single judgment; they evolve rather like a custom and are binding only if they have considerable authoritative support in a line of
judgments. Like customary law, judicially adopted principles need
not be formulated very precisely in the judgments which count as
authority for their existence. All that has to be shown is that they
underlie a series of courts' decisions, that they were in fact a reason
operating in a series of cases.
This is recognized by Professor Dworkin. He does, however, add
a third "source" of legally binding principles: "judgments of the community at large or some identifiable segment thereof." 44 And he adds
in a footnote: "On some occasions, in some kinds of cases, moral
principles accepted as standards within the community will figure
as good reasons for a legal decision, just as, on other occasions, in other
kinds of cases, will standards otherwise established. In this sense, such
principles are part of the legal system, if it is helpful to talk about
law as a system at all, and the flat statement that law and morals
are separate systems is misleading. '"', The morality that Professor
Dworkin has in mind consists of those moral views which became social
norms in the community. No supporter of the thesis of the limits
of law has ever denied that some social norms can be legal norms as well.
The legislator can make a social norm into law either by direct enactment or by stipulating that social customs of a certain type should
44. Dworkin, supra note 35, at 635 (1963).
45. Id. at 635 n.9.
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be binding as law. By the doctrine of precedent the courts can do the
same. To admit as much does not weaken in the least the thesis of the
limits of law.
To challenge the thesis it has to be established that all social norms
are automatically (without prior legislative or judicial recognition)
binding as law at least to the extent to which they do not conflict
with laws created by legislation and precedent. If this were the case
in all legal systems the thesis of the limits of law would indeed be
badly shaken and would need a far-reaching reformulation. In his
subsequent remarks Professor Dworkin implies that this is in fact
the case. 46 I think that he is mistaken, and it is worth pausing to
examine the source of his mistake.
In most countries one of the most general principles restraining
judicial discretion enjoins judges to act only on those values and
opinions which have the support of some important segment of the
population.4 7 There are various grounds on which the principle can
be justified, none of which in itself justifies its full scope. It can be
justified on democratic grounds; it can be defended by arguing that
a judge whose actions affect the fortune of many should not trust his
own judgment if it is not supported by learned opinion; it can be
argued that laws out of tune with community values are unlikely
to achieve their aim or will have some undesirable consequences. ach
of these justifications, and others that can be used, interprets the
principle somewhat differently. A close study of the matter will no
doubt distinguish between various related principles which sometimes reinforce each other and sometimes conflict, or which apply
to different situations. All these principles restrain but do not exclude judicial discretion. They do not oblige the courts to enforce
any specific social norms. They limit their freedom to act on what
they think is right by making it conditional on their ability to show
that they are not alone in that opinion. There is, therefore, no reason
to regard these principles as converting all social morality into law
or as undermining the thesis of the limits of law.
They have, however, a curious, though perhaps not surprising, effect on judicial rhetoric in some countries and especially in the United
States. As they should, courts tend to justify judgments based on discretion by arguments designed to show that the decision is a good
46. Id. at 635 et seq.
47. The main device controlling courts' values and ideology is, of course, not this
principle, but the methods of appointing or electingfjudges.
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one,48 and by other arguments to show that the decision conforms
to the views of some segment of the population. Unfortunately, some
judges like to claim that the values they endorse are not merely the
values of some but embody the national consciousness, represent the
national consensus, are universally acknowledged, etc. This is perhaps harmless rhetoric if it is understood as such. Professor Dworkin,
however, urges us to give literal interpretation to such pronouncements from the bench. The courts apply what they think are community values. It follows that it is wrong to regard them as acting on
their own beliefs as legislators do. They may be wrong in their views
of what the values of the community are, but if so they are wrong on
a point of law, for since they are bound to apply community values
these are part of the law.
This literal interpretation of judicial rhetoric is made possible only
if one is prepared to join the courts in endorsing two really harmful
myths. One is the myth that there is a considerable body of specific
moral values shared by the population of a large and modern country.
The myth of the common morality has made much of the oppression
of minorities possible. It also allows judges to support a partisan point
of view while masquerading as the servant of a general consensus.
The second myth is that the most general values provide sufficient
ground for practical conclusions. This myth holds that, since we all
have a general desire for prosperity, progress, culture, justice, and so
on, we all want precisely the same things and support exactly the same
ideals; and that all the differences between us result from disagreements of fact about the most efficient policies to secure the common
goals. In fact, much disagreement about more specific goals and about
less general values is genuine moral disagreement, which cannot be
resolved by appeal to the most general value-formulations which we
all endorse, for these bear different interpretations for different
people.
The courts tend all too often to claim that a specific policy is entailed by belief in some general value, thus avoiding a concrete justification of their decision, maintaining the rhetoric of common goals
and community values and endorsing partisan positions without admitting it. Some judges may themselves be captives of the myths they
help to perpetuate. But the fact that they are misled should not mis48. Though judges are entitled, sometimes, to act as they think best, that they believe the decision is a good one is never a reason for it; they must have reasons for their
beliefs.

850

Legal Principles and the Limits of Law
lead us. Occasional deviations from the canons of good reasoning can
be dismissed as mistakes, but when constant use is made of a pattern
of argumentation completely devoid of logical validity it is time to
distinguish between myth and rhetoric on the one hand and reality
on the other. And the law should be understood to encompass reality,
not rhetoric.
C.

The Possibilityof a Criteion of Identity
If the thesis of the limits of law is right, there must be a criterion
of identity which sets necessary and sufficient conditions, satisfaction
of which is a mark that a standard is part of a legal system. Austin's
criterion of identity was that all and only the general commands of
one sovereign are part of one legal system. Hart has criticized
this criterion and suggested another. According to his theory every
legal system contains a rule of recognition directed at the courts and
imposing on them an obligation to apply those standards which fulfill
various criteria set out in the rule.4 9 The rule of recognition is a customary rule arising out of the behavior of law-enforcing officials
through a period of time. The rest of the laws of the system are valid
because they fulfill the conditions set out in the rule of recognition.
The general criterion of identity of all legal systems is that each contains a rule of recognition and all those laws satisfying the conditions
it stipulates.
Professor Dworkin claims that no adequate criterion of identity
can be formulated and that therefore the thesis of the limits of law
must be rejected. He directs his attack against Harts criterion and
employs two arguments to show that neither Hart's nor any other
criterion of identity can account for the existence of legal principles.
I shall argue that one of Professor Dworkin's arguments contains a
valid criticism of Hart but does not bear on the possibility of formulating a somewhat different criterion of identity, whereas his second
argument fails altogether.
"Hart's sharp distinction between acceptance and validity," the first
argument runs, "does not hold. If we are arguing for the principle
that a man should not profit from his own wrong, we could cite the
acts of courts and legislatures that exemplify it, but this speaks as
much to the principle's acceptance as its validity. (It seems odd to
49. For arguments supporting this interpretation of Hart's doctrine, me Raz, supra
note 38. at 807-08 & nn.23-24.
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speak of a principle as being valid at all, perhaps because validity is
an all-or-nothing concept, appropriate for rules, but inconsistent with
a principle's dimension of weight.)"' 0 The concept of validity is said
to be inconsistent with the principle's dimension of weight on the
ground that one establishes a principle's validity by showing that it
has "institutional support"; but the amount of support a principle
enjoys determines its weight and is a matter of degree: "[T]he more
support we found, the more weight we could claim for the principle."51 But this is surely mistaken. A principle might have been
referred to frequently by the courts as binding, but have little weight.
The degree of support may sometimes be evidence for a principle's
weight, but it need not be and the two notions are not logically
related.
Legal principles may be valid in precisely the same way that rules
are. They may, for example, be enacted in the constitution or in a
statute, as some of Professor Dworkin's own examples show. It is true,
though, that some legal principles are law because they are accepted
by the judiciary. But this is true of rules as well as principles. It is,
however, an important point which does necessitate a modification
of Hart's criterion of identity. But here again Professor Dworkin
claims too much. He claims that if the master rule says merely that
whatever other rules the community accepts are legally binding then
it fails to act as an identifying criterion distinguishing between law
and social norms.52 Had all social customs in all countries been legally
binding this would have been a valid criticism. Some countries, however, do not recognize custom as a source of law at all. Those legal
systems which do regard customs as legally binding do so only if they
pass certain tests. These tests, if they .are not set out in a statute or
some other law, are laid down by the rule of recognition, which determines under what conditions social customs are binding in law.
The rule of recognition, therefore, does serve to explain the legal
status of general community customs. It cannot, however, explain in
the same way the legal status of judicial customs. Since it is itself a
judicial custom it cannot confer any special status on other judicial
customs. Judicial rule-making, as I indicated above, differs in this
respect from the evolution of principles by the courts. A rule becomes
binding by being laid down in one case as a precedent. It does not
50.
51.
52.
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have to wait until it is accepted in a series of cases to be binding. It
is binding because of the doctrine of precedent which is part of our
rule of recognition. Principles evolved by the courts become binding
by becoming a judicial custom. They are part of the law because they
are accepted by the courts, not because they are valid according to the
rule of recognition.
Hart's criterion of identity must be modified. A legal system consists not only of one customary rule of the law enforcing agencies and
all the laws recognized by it, but of all the customary rules and principles of the law enforcing agencies and all the laws recognized by
them.53 This is an important modification, but it preserves the fundamental point underlying Hart's criterion and shared by many: namely,
that law is an institutionalized normative system and that the fact
that the enforcement of its standards is a duty of special law-enforcing
agencies is one important feature which distinguishes it from many
other normative systems. The importance of this feature of law is
made manifest by distinguishing between legal and non-legal standards
according to whether or not the courts have an obligation to apply
them, either because they are themselves judicial custom or because
judicial customs make their application obligatory.
Professor Dworkin has a second argument disputing the possibility
of formulating an adequate criterion of identity. "True," lie says, "if
we were challenged to back up our claim that some principle is a
principle of law, we would mention any prior cases in which that principle was cited, or figured in the argument ....Unless we could find
some such institutional support, we would probably fail to make out
our case .. . .Yet we could not devise any formula for testing how
much and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a
principle a legal principle."54 In this passage Professor Dworkin is rejecting not merely Hares version of the thesis of the limits of law but
all versions of this thesis. He agrees that if legal and non-legal standards can be distinguished this could only be done by relying on the
fact that only legal standards have adequate institutional support in
the practice of the courts. He denies, however, the possibility of a
general explanation of what counts as adequate institutional support.
It follows that it is impossible to provide a general account of the
difference between legal and non-legal standards and the thesis of the
53. For a more precise formulation of the criterion and a more detailed cxamination
of the problem, see Raz, supra note 38.
54. Dworkin, supra note 2,at 41 [55].
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limits of law must be abandoned. What is the force of this argument?
If a legal system consists, as I have suggested, of those standards which
the courts are bound to recognize, we must agree with Professor
Dworkin that we need a general explanation of what counts as adequate institutional support. For laws are binding on the courts either
because judicial customs make their recognition obligatory or because
they are themselves judicial customs. Thus the acceptability of the
thesis of the limits of law depends on our ability to explain the concept of a judicial custom. But judicial customs are but a special case
of social customs.
What we need is an adequate explanation of the concept of a customary norm. Once we have it we will know what judicial custom is
and will have a complete criterion of identity. Hart has provided such
an explanation. No doubt it is possible to improve on it, but there
is no reason to suppose that the concept of a customary norm defies
analysis. It is true that an analysis of the concept does not give us a
decision procedure determining for every principle or rule whether
or not it has sufficient support to be regarded as a judicial custom."
Borderline cases will remain; they must remain, for customary norms
evolve gradually. But Dworkin's is a very weak argument, which rejects
a distinction because it admits the existence of borderline cases.
55. It is worth reminding oursdlves that not every principle is evolved by the courts,
many result from legislative action.
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